In many heterogeneous networked applications the integrity of multimedia data plays an essential role, but is not directly supported by the application. In this paper, we propose a method which enables an individual user to detect tampering with a multimedia file without changing the software application provided by the third party. Our method is based on a combination of cryptographic signatures and fragile watermarks, i.e., watermarks that are destroyed by illegitimate tampering. We show that the proposed system is provably secure under standard cryptographic assumptions.
INTRODUCTION
Commercial transactions as well as private communication are increasingly performed using electronic infrastructures-most importantly the WWW. These applications are typically built using standard software and existing third-party network infrastructures (such as standard Web browsers, standardized network protocols or off-the-shelf video streaming tools). This infrastructure is commonly used to transmit multimedia information (like video or audio files or facsimiles). The integrity of these data can be of crucial importance and may have legal and commercial consequences. Unfortunately, the level of security a user can achieve depends on the services provided, as the users themselves typically cannot change the architecture of the overall system. In this paper, we describe a method for ensuring the integrity and authenticity of multimedia data which overcomes this limitation. We use a combination of cryptographic signatures and digital watermarks to encode authentication information in the media objects themselves, which allows us to completely decouple the authentication mechanism from the rest of the application. In essence, the security information is "tunneled" through the third-party system. No modification of the infrastructure is necessary, which makes our approach feasible for a wide range of applications; the approach is also targeted towards applications built on large portions of legacy code, which can only be changed with considerable effort or cost.
Consider the following example scenarios:
During an online auction of a precious item, a potential bidder wants to make sure that an image of an item displayed by the auction software adequately displays the item for sale.
In a video conferencing tool that is used to facilitate online business, both parties may (for documentation purposes) require a proof of authenticity and integrity of the video stream.
Digital images (or digitally recorded video streams) cannot readily be used as evidence in legal cases, as they can easily be forged or altered.
In particular, portions of the images can be blurred or two images can be pasted together to remove suspicious parts.
Some government agencies store documents (such as drivers licenses, birth certificates, etc.) only in digitized form. Typically, these documents are scanned and the resulting images are retained in an image database. Given the availability of sophisticated image processing software, it is obvious that the integrity of such electronic documents must be protected.
In all cases, both the integrity and authenticity of a multimedia object is of central importance for the security of the overall software system. Integrity and authenticity can be guaranteed by cryptographically signing the multimedia objects in question; in a naive solution, a media object is always stored together with its corresponding signature (Friedman, 1993) . Tightly integrating a multimedia authentication mechanism into such applications can be a serious obstacle in practice, as this may require considerable changes to existing software architectures or the adoption of nonstandard application software. From a software-engineering point of view, modular media authentication mechanisms would be desirable that can be added as plug-ins or front-ends to existing software systems and third-party network infrastructures at ease. In this paper, we give a construction for a modular-but yet provably secure-media authentication mechanism that can readily be plugged into existing software systems. Technically, we use invertible fragile watermarks to store cryptographic signatures directly in the media objects themselves. Using this system, the authentication mechanism can be completely separated from the application software, as all authentication information is readily encoded (in a format-compliant way) in the media file itself.
In contrast to classical digital watermarks which are designed to resist signal processing attacks, fragile watermark encode additional data imperceptibly in some media file without providing any robustness; that is, signal processing attacks will destroy the embedded watermark. For an overview of digital watermarking technology see (Katzenbeisser and Petitcolas, 2000) . Fragile watermarks can be seen as a kind of alerter that reports whether a media object was tampered. In our approach, we use invertible fragile watermarks, which allow to insert a fragile watermark into an object as usual, but facilitate the lossless removal of the watermark from an untampered watermarked object. More precisely, if a watermark is successfully detected, the information contained in the recovered watermark, together with the watermark key, suffices to remove the watermark completely from the object.
Fragile watermarks are natural candidates for assuring the integrity of image files and were proposed by various authors (e.g., Schneider and Chang, 1996; Xie and Arce, 1998) . In these approaches, image-dependant patterns are encoded as fragile watermarks in digital images. An image is considered authentic if and only if it is possible to correctly recover these patterns. If a file with such a watermark is modified, then either the watermark cannot be detected any more or the recovered patterns do not match the image. In both cases, the image is considered to be tampered. Unfortunately, this approach has the apparent drawback that it is not possible to formally prove its security in a cryptographically precise way, as properties of the watermark embedder or detector become security-critical.
In this paper we provide the first construction for a provably secure watermark-based authentication scheme for digital media files. In contrast to previous schemes, we use watermarks merely as a communication channel for transmitting a cryptographic signature; the scheme therefore draws its security entirely from this signature. In our approach, the signing algorithm produces an authenticated object O out of a media file O in such a way that the integrity and authenticity of O can readily be asserted using only a public key and O. As O will be perceptually similar to O, O can readily be used as a replacement for O in existing application software, thereby adding a layer of security.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. After reviewing the necessary watermarking technology in Section 2, we introduce our framework for media authentication in Section 3. Finally, we present two provably secure constructions for media authentication schemes in Sections 4 and 5; the second construction can be used for large media files or in streaming applications.
INVERTIBLE WATERMARKS
While almost all previous watermarking schemes introduced some small amount of irreversible distortion in the data during the embedding process, invertible watermarks (Honsinger et al., 1999; Fridrich et al., 2001; Fridrich et al., 2002a; Steinebach and Dittmann, 2003a; Maas et al., 2002; Dittmann and Benedens, 2003) 
From the previous description it is obvious that it is not possible to embed an invertible watermark in every object. In case the part B O cannot be sufficiently compressed, there is not enough room to store both the watermark payload and the compressed part C O . However, typical multimedia files (such as images or audio files) contain enough redundant, compressible information so that the watermarking operation works for virtually all relevant objects.
This general construction principle can be instantiated for different types of media objects: for example (Fridrich et al., 2002b) gave two different constructions that operate on JPEG images; (Steinebach and Dittmann, 2003b) showed how audio files can be watermarked in an invertible manner. Other implementations can be found in (Fridrich et al., 2001; Fridrich et al., 2002a; Dittmann et al., 2002) .
It is important to note that the construction of media authentication schemes given in this paper is general and works for any invertible watermarking scheme. We will show that the security of the scheme only depends on the cryptographic primitives involved, while the watermark serves merely as insecure communication channel and thus does not affect the security of the authentication scheme; a formal proof of this claim will be given in Sections 4 and 5.2. For this reason, we will treat an invertible watermarking scheme as black box in the remaining parts of the paper.
MEDIA AUTHENTICATION SCHEMES
Media authentication schemes based on invertible watermarks can be described by a tuple of four probabilistic polynomial time algorithms GENKEY, PROTECT , VERIFY , RECONSTRUCT . GENKEY denotes the keygeneration process; by using a private key, PROTECT authenticates an object O and outputs its signed version O. Signed objects can be verified by the algorithm VERIFY and a public key; VERIFY either outputs TRUE or FALSE . In the first case, the object is deemed authentic; in the latter case, the object is considered modified. RECONSTRUCT reverses the protection mechanism and losslessly reconstructs O out of O.
Definition
Formally, an invertible media authentication scheme is defined as follows:
Algorithm GENKEY generates keys for the application. On input 1 n , GENKEY produces a triple of strings K P , K V , K R with |K P K V K R | = n; the operation denotes string concatenation. The key K P will be used in the protection step, whereas K V and K R are used for verification and recovery. The verification key K V is a public key, whereas K P and K R are private keys.
Algorithm PROTECT takes K P , K R and an object O. Note that we have defined all algorithms as probabilistic, which implies that they can fail on certain instances (as noted above it may not be possible to embed a watermark in an invertible manner); in this case, the algorithms output a special symbol FAIL . We require that the media authentication scheme "works" for almost all objects that can be wa-
As usual, we will denote a cryptographic signature scheme as triple of probabilistic polynomial algorithms S = GENSIGN , SIGN, SIGVERIFY ; GENSIGN denotes the key generation, SIGN the signing and SIGVERIFY the signature verification algorithm. A signature scheme is said to be secure, if it is secure against existential forgery of signatures under a chosen-message attack (Goldwasser et al., 1988) ; that is, if the attacker is unable-even with access to a signing oracle-to forge a valid pair of a message and a corresponding signature.
Attacker Model
Sticking to Kerckhoffs' principle, we assume that an attacker possesses complete knowledge of the system. The general goal of an attacker will be to forge an authentic object relative to a public key K V , whose corresponding secret key K P is unknown to him. Similar to attacks against cryptographic signature schemes, we can distinguish several types of attacks against media authentication schemes according to the possibilities for an attacker to interfere with the system. It seems natural to assume that an attacker will know several protected media files under one verification key K V , as such objects might be freely available on the Internet. A more powerful attacker may even launch a chosen message attack. In this setup, an attacker is able to obtain protected objects of his own choice. That is, he can obtain an authenticated version O of object O chosen during the attack. In imaging applications, such an attack is particularly realistic, as long as the attacker has physical access to the imaging device and can take pictures of his own choice.
For this reason, we adopt the notion of existential forgery under chosen message attacks for the present scenario. For a given public key K V , the attacker attempts to output an object O so that VERIFY (O, K V ) = TRUE . During his attack, he is free to use an oracle that delivers him arbitrary authenticated objects on request. We say that an attack is successful, if the attacker manages to output (with non-negligible probability) an object O together with an alleged original O such that VERIFY(O, K V ) = TRUE , where the original object O was not presented to the oracle previously. It is generally agreed that this is the most general attacker model one can define for the signature scenario.
Definition 1 Let GENKEY, PROTECT , VERIFY , RECONSTRUCT be a media authentication scheme and QUERY K P be an oracle that computes
An attack is a probabilistic algorithm ATTACK with oracle access to QUERY K P and success probability ε ATTACK such that
with probability ε ATTACK FAIL with probability 1 − ε ATTACK ,
where O i denotes the input to the i-th oracle query QUERY K P . The probability is taken over all coin tosses of ATTACK and all keys K
We say that a media authentication scheme is secure, if the success probability of every probabilistic polynomial time attack is negligible:
Definition 2 A media authentication scheme is secure against existential forgery of authenticated objects, if every probabilistic polynomial time attack ATTACK has negligible success probability.
OFFLINE AUTHENTICATION
In this section, we describe a media authentication scheme that needs access to the whole media file at once during the protection algorithm (such schemes will be called offline media authentication schemes). This construction is therefore primarily suitable for image files or short video sequences. A separate construction for streaming media will be given in Section 5. Let S = GENSIGN, SIGN, SIGVERIFY be a cryptographic signature scheme producing signatures of length k, ENCRYPT and DECRYPT be the encryption and decryption function of a symmetric cipher and COMPRESS be the compression algorithm of a lossless compression scheme. Furthermore, we fix an invertible watermarking scheme SEPARATE , JOIN that can embed watermark strings of length k.
Loosely speaking, the media authentication scheme stores a cryptographic signature of the unmodified portion of the object (the part A O ) and the encrypted, compressed part B O as an invertible watermark. During the verification process, we check whether we can extract a valid cryptographic signature out of the watermark. The construction is as follows:
GENKEY runs GENSIGN to obtain a key pair K SS , K V S ; furthermore, it computes a key K E for the symmetric cipher and a random string K W . 
H is a hash function and Proof. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that there exists an attack ATTACK (with access to the media authentication oracle QUERY K P ) against the scheme, which succeeds with non-negligible probability. We show that in this case there exists also an attack FORGE (with access to a signing oracle SIGNQUERY K SS ) against S, which contradicts the assumption.
We construct the signature forging algorithm FORGE (for the public signature key K V S ) in the following manner. On input K V S , FORGE chooses random keys K E and K W and simulates ATTACK. Whenever ATTACK makes an oracle query QUERY K P (O i ), this query is replaced by the following probabilistic algorithm, which utilizes the signing oracle SIGNQUERY K SS ; here, K SS denotes the corresponding secret signature key:
Note that JOIN either outputs FAIL 
This requires that both O and O i agree on part A; furthermore, by ENCRYPT being uniquely decipherable, we have
. This can only be the case if both O and O i agree on part C and thus also on part B. We conclude that O = O i , but this contradicts the definition of a successful attack against the media authentication scheme. This completes the proof.
ONLINE AUTHENTICATION
The authentication method of the previous section assumes that the full media O is present when the media file is authenticated. However, for many multimedia applications such a solution is unacceptable, e.g., in audio or video streaming. In this section we present an online authentication scheme that operates only on fixed-length chunks of media at a time, but nevertheless allows the full media object to be authenticated. For this purpose, an object O is considered to consist of n chunks of equal length O 1 , . . . , O n ; in abuse of notation,
The online media authentication scheme presented in this paper is targeted towards applications where it must be possible to produce authenticated excerpts, i.e., small consecutive portions of the media stream. For example, consider the evidence produced by eavesdropping a telephone, which might be automatically authenticated by a recording device; in a court hearing only a small and relevant part of the overall evidence is presented to the public. In order to prevent tampering, this excerpt should be produced without access to the secrets of the eavesdropping system (i.e., the protection key K P ). Nevertheless the integrity and authenticity of the excerpt should be publicly verifiable.
Given an object O, we call an object O ′ an excerpt of O, if O ′ may be obtained from O by removing some chunks from the beginning and the end of O.
Given an original object O, it is possible with the proposed system to generate a signed object O such that each excerpt of the signed object O ′ O can be checked for its integrity and authenticity without further preprocessing. More precisely, the verification algorithm described below will detect any modifications in an excerpt of O and will report the presence of non-consecutive chunks.
Formally, the attacker model we use for online authentication schemes is similar to the one presented in Section 3.2, with the sole exception that the production of excerpts is not considered an attack. Again, an attacker is forced to perform a selective forgery under a chosen message attack. However, the media object obtained at the end of the attack must not be an excerpt of an object submitted to the signing oracle previously.
Definition 4 Let GENKEY, PROTECT , VERIFY , RECONSTRUCT be an online authentication scheme and
An attack is a probabilistic algorithm SATTACK with oracle access to QUERY K P and success probability ε SATTACK such that 
Again, we say that an online media authentication scheme is secure, if every probabilistic polynomial attack has only negligible success probability.
Construction
In this section, we provide the construction of an online media authentication scheme that operates block by block on the media content. Essentially, we apply the authentication scheme described in the previous section on each chunk O i , with the exception that the there is some linkage between the chunks, computed by a hash function. Technically, we rely on the concept of hash chains introduced by (Gennaro and Rohatgi, 1997) . Fix any collection of hash functions
for any super-logarithmically growing function ℓ : N → N. Denote with k h an index to H; furthermore, let k be the length of the cryptographic signatures. We assume that both k h and k are polynomial in the security parameter. For the construction we use an invertible watermarking scheme that is capable of storing k + ℓ(k h ) bits. The construction is as follows:
GENKEY runs GENSIGN to obtain a tuple of keys K SS , K V S ; furthermore it computes a key K E for a symmetric cipher and a random string K W . GENKEY ′ outputs the keys
PROTECT, on input O = O 1 · · · O n , K P and K R , performs the following steps:
and K V , performs the following steps: 
Security Against Forgeries
In a similar way as in Theorem 3, the security of the above scheme can be established:
Theorem Proof. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that there exists an attack SATTACK against the above scheme, which succeeds with a non-negligible probability. We show that in this case there exists also an attack FORGE against S, which contradicts the assumption. We construct the signature forging algorithm FORGE (for the public signature verification key K V S ) in the following manner. On input K V S , FORGE first chooses random keys K E and K W . Finally, FORGE invokes SATTACK. In the rest of the proof, denote with O (i) the input to the i-th query to the oracle QUERY K P , whereas O (i) j denotes the j-th chunk of O (i) ; the number of chunks in O (i) is given by n i .
Whenever SATTACK makes an oracle query QUERY K P (O (i) ) in order to obtain a signed stream
n i , this query is simulated by the following probabilistic computation that uses a signature oracle SIGNQUERY K SS (essentially, this code is equivalent to that of PROTECT): In summary, if case 2 happens, then we can either find a pre-image of a random string with respect to H h or a collision of H h (a formal proof of this claim uses again a reducibility argument). By the assumptions on H, this can happen only with negligible probability. This completes the proof.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we provided two constructions which solve the data integrity problem for multimedia applications by combining methods from cryptography and watermarking. Technically, we used digital watermarks to encode cryptographic signatures directly in multimedia files. One construction is suitable for images and short media files, whereas the other one is targeted towards streaming applications. Both schemes were shown to be secure under standard cryptographic assumptions and can easily be incorporated into existing software systems or used as front-end programs to applications whose code is not under control of the user.
